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ABSTRACT 
Jurisdictional mismatch plagues contemporary environmeiTtal 
1aw and policy. The division of authority and responsibility for 
environmental protection between the federal and state 
govemments lacks any cohesive rationale or justification. The 
federal govemment regulates in many areas where there is nc clear 
anaiytical basis for federal involvement. At the saroe time, the 
federal govemment is relatively absent where a strongeT federal 
presence could be justified. Conversely, states ere precluded, 
discouraged, or otherwise inhibited from adopting environment:::d 
protections where state efforts would be worthwhile. ln addition, 
state intervention seeps into are8.S where 21. dominant feder.'l.l ro1P 
vvould be more defensible, This jurisdictional mismatch produces 
sub-optimal levels of environmental protection, V\lastes regulatory 
resources, discourages innovation,, and iHhibits the c.doj:;tio,·, ax,C: 
evolution of more effective environmental protection measures. 
Environmental protections would be more successfl.tl v/ere 
responsibility divided between the federal and state governrnents 
in a more justifiable manner. To address the cw.'!·ent n-:>ismatr;h, the 
federal govemment should reorient its efforts toward those areas in 
which the federal govemment possesses an institutional advantage,, 
due to economies of scaie or where state and local govemments 
are incapable of addressing environmental problems,. such a~ 
where there are substantial interstate spillovers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary federal enviromnental regulations are often 
faulted for tl;eir excessive rigidity and centraiizatiuii.I 1~s;. equd, if 
less commonly analyzed, problem with current environmental 
protection effm1s is the mismatch between the nahlre and scope of 
environmental problems and the nah1re and scope of those 
instiiutions charged with solving them. That is, setting aside the 
choice of specific policy instruments, the cun-ent division of 
authority and responsibility for environmental protection betvveen 
the federal and state govemments lacks a coherent rationale. 1\lo 
1 This critique is Slmm1mized in Jonathan H. Adler, Letting F(fiy Flml'els 
Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in THE 
JURJSDYNA!V!ICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAG!V!A TIC 
VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263-64 (Jim Chen ed., 2004); see also Richard 
B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, J 3 
COLUivl. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) ("[T]he system has grown to the point 
where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central 
planning of the economy to achieve enviroru11ental goals."); DANIEL A. FARBER, 
EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999) (summarizing problems of overly centralized 
environmental regulation). 
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particular theory of the proper role of varying levels of govem.n!ent 
in t:nvironment~il policy ce;n explain the ct.uTent <kvisi,}n. The 
result is a jurisdictional mismatch in enviromnental policy that 
compromises the effectiveness of measures intended to pratect t11e 
environrnent. 
The federal govemment regulates in many areas where there 
is no clear analytical basis for federal regulation. At the .same 
time, the federal govemment is relatively absent INhere a stronger 
federal presence could be justified. Conversely, existing federal 
statutes and regulations often preclude, discourage, or othenNise 
inhibit state and local govemments from adopting en"lirGn:i-iltT,>:.:,1 
protections where state effm-ts would be wmthv-vhile. Yet states 
are not inactive. Rather, it appears that state po1icyrn.akers 
increasingly seek to satisfy their constituents' demand for 
environmental protection by intervening in areas better left in 
the hands of the federal govemment. This mismatch between 
envir01m1ental problems and regulatory responsibility undermints 
environmental protection and compounds the problems of 
instrument choice and implementation. It also erodes politiGaJ. 
accountability for environmenta.l policy. 
A claim of jurisdictional mismatch should be pi:emised 
upon some account c.f !he p·roJ=~er state and fed~st .. cJ tolts 
in environmental protection. Accordingly, Part I outlines why 
"ecologies of scale" suggest that many environrnenta! problems 
should be left in state or local hands. It further identifies some 
of the benefits of decentralized environmental decision-m<:~.king. 
}\Jot all environmental concerns are best handled at the state 
or local level, however. Pari: H identifies and evaluates those 
considerations which might justify a preference for federal 
authority over environrnental matters. '~Nhile federalism principles 
suggest a general presumption in favor of state responsibility for 
various policy concerns, this presumption may be overcome --;;:her~ 
there is a distinct and readily identifiable federal interest, su.:h <':~ 
clir im':Eorstate spiHvver or econmnies of s.:::a1e that prv''ide the 
federal government -vvith an institutional advantage in addressing 
particuJar concems. Absent su.:::h considerations, hO'Neve~·, most 
environmental matters are be2t left in state and local hands. 
Pmi HI contrasts the proper division of state and federal 
responsibilities with cunent practice, revealing a widespread 
"institutional misrnatch." While there is a principled case for an 
active: federal role in many aspects of environmental policy, the 
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federal government is relatively absent from those areas. At the 
same time, the federal government is heavily involved in many 
areas better left in state and local hands. One potential impact of 
such mismatch is greater state involvement in matters properly 
addressed at the federal level. 
The institutional mismatch within environmental policy 
cannot be fixed overnight. This article concludes by suggesting 
some modest steps that could be taken to begin reorienting federal 
efforts toward those areas in which federal action is most needed 
and that match federal environmental authmity with the greatest 
t1T'Iiro1m1enta! need. 
I. ECOLOGIES OF SCALE 
As a general structural matter, it is more efficient and 
effective to address environmental problems through institutions of 
equivalent scope as the problem in question. 2 As Professor Esty 
notes, where the scope of a problem does not match the 
responsible institution's jurisdiction, "the cost-benefit calculus will 
be skewed and either too little or too much enviromnental 
protection will be provided."3 By matching jurisdiction with the 
scope of a given problem, the institutional stmcture can ensure the 
greatest "match" between a given problem and the institutional 
response. Environmental protection efforts are most likely to be 
optimal where those who bear the costs and reap the benefits of a 
given policy determine how best, and even whether, to address a 
given enviromnental concern. This does not mean that all 
environmental problems should be addressed at the same level, 
however. Rather, the varying scopes of various environmental 
problems suggest the need for a "multitier regulatory stmcture that 
2 See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO 
IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (1996) ("[T]he size of a geographic area 
affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate 
govemmentallevel for responding to the pollution."). 
3 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
570, 587 (1996). Such a jurisdictional mismatch can also create a "regulatory 
cmmnons." See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatol}' Commons: A 
Themy of Regulatmy Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REv. 27 (2003) ("Regulatory conunons 
problems arise where a social ill does not fall squarely within any particular 
political-legal regime's turf."). Professor Buzbee suggests that the "'regulatory 
commons problem' creates predictable incentives in complex, multi-layered 
political-legal contexts for social ills not to be overregulated, but to remain 
unaddressed, to remain gaps in regulation." Jd. at 5. 
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tracks the complexity and diversity of environmental problems."4 
The federalist structure of American government supports 
a general, albeit rebuttable, presumption that any given policy 
question should be addressed by state governments.5 This 
presumption is embodied in the stmcture of the Federal 
Constitution, which grants the federal govemment limited and 
emunerated powers while reserving all other matters to the states.6 
For the federal government to act, it must demonstrate that a given 
policy is within the scope of its enumerated powers. 7 Where the 
federal government does not act, matters will remain in state 
hands.8 
This basic Constitutional structure suggests a principle of 
"subsidiarity"9-the principle that problems should be addressed at 
4 Esty, supra note 3, at 571. 
5 See James L. Huffman, Maldng Environmental Regulation More Adaptive 
Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KA.N. L. REv. 1377, 
1379 (2005) ("[O]ther core values of American government are served by 
decentralization."). See also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom 
and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 
535, 536-38 (1997) (arguing for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of 
decentralization" in environmental policy). 
6 Those powers not expressly delegated are, as the Tenth Amendment makes 
explicit, "reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite."). 
7 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The 
powers of the legislature are defmed, and limited; and that those limits may not 
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."). 
8 For further discussion of the application of constitutional- federalism 
principles to environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism 
and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 
(2005). For a somewhat different perspective on this question, see Robert V. 
Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and 
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809 (2002). 
9 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the 
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 338-39 
(1994) (defming "subsidiarity" as the "notion that action should be taken at the 
lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be 
achieved"); Huffman, supra note 5, at 1381 (subsidiarity is "the idea that social 
decision-making should take place at the least centralized level appropriate to the 
decision in question"). This principle is endorsed in the principles for 
sustainability of Agenda 21. U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, 
Rio de Janerio, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, ~ 8.5(g), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (calling for national governments to delegate environmental 
responsibilities "to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective 
2005] MISMATCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 135 
- the lowest level at which they can be practically addressed. 
Subsidiarity is particularly appropriate in the context of 
environmental policy, and leads to the sort of "multitier regulatory 
structure" that Professor Esty suggests.10 Because most 
environmental problems are local or regional in nature, 11 there is a 
strong case that most (though not all) environmental problems 
should be addressed at the state and localleve1. 12 Given the nature 
of this nation's federalist system, this approach would entail 
allocating responsibility for most environmental problems to state 
governments with the hope, if not the expectation, that state 
governments would leave ma:p.y concerns to local or regional 
authorities. 13 
There are additional policy reasons to s~pport a general 
presumption in favor of state and local responsibility for 
environmental concems. 14 An overly centralized environmental 
action"). 
10 This is not meant to suggest that Professor Esty would endorse all of this 
author's analysis. To the contrary, while Professor Esty endorses a similar 
framework, he endorses a greater level of federal enviroiUnental regulation than 
does this author. Compare Esty, supra note 3, at 571, and Adler, supra note 1. 
11 See, e.g., BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27 ("The environmental harm 
caused by the emission of the same amount of pollution can vary widely, 
depending on local environmental conditions."). 
12 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 206 (2002) ("[T]here is 
growing recognition that ecologically sound management must be local and/or 
regional in character, tailored to the ecosystem context."); Wallace E. Oates, A 
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002) 
(''[W]here environmental quality is basically a local public good, the case for the 
setting of environmental standards at an appropriately decentralized level of 
government is quite compelling."). 
13 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM 
WASHINGTON 223 (2005) ("State governments should similarly leave the making 
of most pollution-control laws to local governments unless the latter lack 
institutional competence."). It is fair to note that environmental problems rarely 
respect jurisdiCtional boundaries, an:d existing political subdivisions do not track 
ecological boundaries. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 212 ("Conventional 
territorially delimited lines of authority are, almost without exception, drawn in 
near total disregard of ecological boundaries .... "). Moreover, the relevant 
ecological boundaries will vary given the particular ecological concern. 
Airsheds, watersheds, and terrestrial ecosystem will rarely be mutually 
overlapping. As a legal and political matter, however, we are in some sense 
"stuck" with existing political subdivisions although states and local 
governments may, in some cases, be capable to create intermediary institutions 
with jurisdictional authority that traces given environmental concerns. 
14 See Huffinan, supra note 5, at 1381 (Although "the principle of 
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regulatory system is itself an "affront to nature."15 Ecological 
systems vary tremendously from one place to the next. The failure 
to take into account local environmental conditions-let alone 
local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions-leads to "one 
size fits all" policies that fit few areas well, if at all. 16 For 
example, an apple orchard in Washington State has different 
requirements than · an orchard in upstate New York because 
effective pest control strategies will vary depending with 
differences in climate, topography and local conditions. 17 Federal 
mandates that municipalities treat stormwater like industrial 
pollution discharges or require double liners for landfills may 
make sense in the northeast, but such requirements are "ill-suited 
to arid regions" with little rainfall or clay-based soils. 18 Requiring 
secondary wastewater treatment makes sense in many cities, but 
adds little value in coastal communities. 19 Even where states and 
localities have flexibility in selecting the means of meeting a given 
subsidiarity ... does not insist that centralization is never appropriate," it also 
"reflects a presumption in favor of decentralization."); Revesz, supra note 5, at 
536-38 (providing reasons for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of 
decentralization" in environmental policy). 
15 SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 228; see also PIETRO S. NIVOLA & JoN A. 
SHIELDS, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LOCAL RIGORS OF U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 36 (2001) (noting that ecosystem-based 
regulation may require greater reliance upon local judgments); Karldminen, 
supra note 12, at 194 (2002) ("[T]he environmental consequences of our actions 
may also vary widely, depending upon the particular ecosystem context in which 
the action occurs."). 
16 See Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental 
Federalism: An Examination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM 225,225-26 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997J ("There 
is recognition that homogenous solutions applied to heterogeneous problems 
often yield high costs and weak results."). While, as a theoretical matter, federal 
regulation could take into account regional variation, "federal regulation 
generally imposes uniform requirements throughout the country" and, where 
variable standards exist, it is not due to regional environmental differences. 
Revesz, supra note 5, at 537. 
17 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 209-10; see also Andrew P. Morriss, 
Pesticides and Environmental Federalism: An Empirical and Qualitative 
Analysis of§ 24(c) Registrations, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM, supra note 
16, at 133, 167 ("The information problems for a national regulator attempting to 
license every use of every pesticide are so overwhelming that the national 
government can never hope to meaningfully solve them."). 
18 NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
19 See id. at 4 (citing COMM. ON WASTEWATER MGMT. FOR COASTAL URBAN 
AREAS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING WASTEWATER IN COASTAL 
URBAN AREAS (1993), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309048265/ 
htrnl/index.htrnl). 
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federal environmental goal, the impositiOn of uniform 
environmental standards may still "conflict with practicalities on 
the ground in particular jurisdictions."20 
In addition to allowing for a closer fit between local 
ecological conditions and environmental policies, a suitably 
decentralized regulatory system provides several other 
advantages?1 First, the ecological and economic diversity of the 
nation requires local lmowledge and expertise that is often 
unavailable at the federalleve1. 22 A more decentralized system is 
better able to overcome this "knowledge problem,"23 and ensure 
that regulatory measures take account of local conditions.24 
Second, decentralization, and the resulting policy experimentation 
and interjurisdictional competition, can encotrrage policy 
innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic, 
environmental, and other demands of their constifuents.25 As a 
result of such competition, states are able to learn from each 
others' successes and failures.26 This competition allows states to 
act as environmental "laboratories" developing new and improved 
ways of addressing environmental concerns?7 
20 NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 34. 
21 These advantages are discussed in greater detail in Adler, supra note 1, at 
265-70. See also PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 23 (2004). 
22 See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27 ("Federal regulators never have 
been and never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of 
information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the 
technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources."); John 
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 
1183, 1218 (1995) (noting that "[t]he lmowledge necessary to administer any air 
pollution control program ... can be found only at the local level"). 
23 See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 519, 519-20 (1945) (detailing the economic problem resulting from 
"the fact that the lmowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use 
never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory lmowledge which all the separate 
individuals possess"). 
24 See FARBER, supra note 1, at 180 ("By decentralizing environmental 
decision-making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to changing 
circumstances and new information."). 
25 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 
64 J. PoL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (describing the dynamic between the "consumer-
voter" and their representative local government). 
26 See FARBER, supra note 1, at 182-83; see also TESKE, supra note 21, at 
240 (noting that "[e]ven when [state experiments] fail, they provide important 
information for other states and for national policy"). 
27 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
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In a decentralized system there is more likely to be a "fit" 
between a given jurisdiction's policies and the preferences of local 
residents.Z8 Environmental matters often implicate subjective 
value preferences which may be quite variable across the nation. 
As a result, there is not always a single "right" answer to a given 
environmental question, such as whether the national ambient 
air quality standard for ozone should be 0.08 or 0.075 parts 
per million. Each potential standard imposes a different 
trade-off between competing values and interests. Relatedly, 
decentralization can enhance accountability; as Marci Hamilton 
observes, "[t]he smaller the polity in geography and in population, 
the easier it is for the people (1) to monitor what their government 
is doing, (2) to criticize or praise, and therefore (3) to affect public 
policy."29 Decentralized systems are also less prone to rent-
seeking.30 
In sum, there is a strong case for a general presumption in 
favor of decentralization-a presumption that can be overcome in 
any specific policy context by demonstrating the need for federal 
intervention. Where such a justification for federal action is 
lacking, however, localized control of environmental policy will 
produce enviromnental measures that are more likely to reflect the 
preferences and needs of those who will be most affected by them. 
J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and econom.ic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). See 
also David A. Dana, State Browrifields Programs as Laboratories of 
Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86,97-104 (2005). 
28 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the- Founders' 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) ("The first, and most 
axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be 
adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national govemment must 
take a uniforrn.,---and hence less desirable-approach."). 
29 Marci Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 321 
(2003); see also Huffinan, supra note 5, at 1393 ("As a simple matter of 
arithmetic, an individual vote carries more weight in a small democratic polity 
than in a large one."); BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 7 ("Allocation to local 
governments of regulatory authority over local extemalities allows decisions to 
be made by the representatives of the decisions who benefit the most and pay the 
most for higher environmental quality."). 
30 See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: 
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 1, 6 (1995). Of course, this is not to deny the existence ofrent-seeking, as 
well as political corruption in state and local government. Such phenomena 
exist, to one degree or another, in all levels of government. 
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A default rule in favor of decentralization takes advantage of the 
"ecologies of scale" in environmental policy. Yet such a 
preference is only a default rule, and there are several potential 
justifications for federal intervention, to which this article now 
turns. 
II. BASES FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
A preference for subsidiarity does not mean there should be 
no federal environmental regulation. At most it creates a 
rebuttable presumption toward decentralization-a presumption 
that can be overcome with a demonstration that more centralized 
action is necessary or likely to produce a more optimal result. 31 
Specifically, it suggests that there should be an identifiable federal 
interest, or some reason to believe that state and local governments 
will be systematically incapable or unwilling to adopt publicly 
desired environmental measures, before the federal government 
gets involved. Although such a division of authority is not 
mandated by the Constitution, it is ge~erally consistent with the 
federalist principles embodied in the nation's founding 
document. 32 
Following are some of the bases upon which one could argue 
for federal intervention in environmental matters. Each is 
analytically distinct and, as detailed below, some bases are far 
stronger than others. For instance, while the argument for federal 
action to address interstate spillovers is unimpeachable, claims that 
federal regulation is necessary to prevent a "race to the bottom" 
are questionable on both theoretical and empirical grounds. While 
there is some overlap in the categories below, they are nonetheless 
helpful in evaluating the relative strength of arguments for federal 
involvement in various environmental concerns. Further, they can 
be used to help identify what sort of federal intervention is most 
likely to produce, or at least approach, the optimal environmental 
result. The sort of federal intervention best suited to controlling 
31 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 536-38. 
32 As noted earlier, this principle underlies the basic federalist structure of the 
Constitution, under which the federal . government is delegated limited, 
enumerated powers, whereas the states retain all powers not delegated to the 
federal government or barred by other constitutional provisions. See supra note 
6 and accompanying text. For example, state governments retain a plenary 
police power to prevent nuisances and protect the health, welfare and morals of 
their citizenry, whereas the federal government has no such power. 
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interstate spillovers, for example, may not be the sort of federal 
intervention most likely to prevent a welfare-reducing "race-to-
the-bottom," and vice-versa. 
A. Interstate Spillovers 
The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the 
context of interstate spillovers, such as when pollution crosses 
state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict 
on their own. 33 Where activity in State A causes pollution in State 
B, there is an almost unimpeachable case for federal involvement, 
even if only to adjudicate the relevant dispute. 34,. While one may 
reasonably expect State A to adopt measures to control the 
environmental costs of economic activity within State A, 
policymakers have little reason to be concerned with the harms 
imposed on other jurisdictions. In such a context, State A is 
unlikely to adopt sufficient controls because it would bear the 
primary costs of any such regulatory measures, whereas the 
primary beneficiaries of such controls would be in State B. 
Indeed, absent some extemal controls or dispute resolution system, 
the presence of interstate spillovers can actually encourage polices 
that extemalize environmental harms, such as subsidizing 
development near jurisdictional borders so as to ensure that 
environmental harms fall disproportionately "downsh·eam. "35 
Policymakers in State B may wish to take action, but they will be 
33 This analysis deliberately excludes non-physical externalities, such as 
aesthetic or moral harms resulting from disapproval of another region's 
environmental policies. If the costs resulting purely from such subjective value 
preferences are a suitable basis for federal intervention, there is no limit to the 
potential justifications for federal involvement. For this reason, the analysis is 
focused on physical or otherwise tangible spillovers, such· as those that would 
have been actionable under common law. This not only includes emitting 
pollution, but also obstructing or modifying water currents and the like. 
34 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for TransboundmJ' Pollution, 
46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) ("Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by 
any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for 
shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of 
governance."). But see David D. Haddock, Sizing Up Sovereigns: Federal 
Systems, Their Origin, Their Decline, Their Prospects, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 1, 15 ("[T]o call for national intervention 
whenever an externality crosses a state line is to commit the fallacy of the 
publicly interested government."). Haddock notes that the costs from some 
interstate spillovers may be less than those imposed by "a grasping, inept, or 
apathetic regulator." Id. 
35 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 541-42. 
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unable to control pollution created in State A without the 
cooperation of State A. Even where polluting activity imposes 
substantial environmental harm within State A, the externalization 
of a portion of the harm is likely to result in the adoption of less 
stringent environmental controls.36 Therefore, federal intervention 
of some kind is justified. 
While interstate spillovers are a real concern, a caveat is in 
order. Most transboundary pollution problems remain rather 
localized in scope. Ozone-forming emissions in southeastern 
Pennsylvania certainly affect air quality in parts ofNew Jersey, but 
they do not affect Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Sulfur dioxide 
emissions from coal-fired utilities in Ohio may increase pollution 
in upstate New York and Vermont, but they do not harm Tacoma, 
Washington. Such interstate spillovers may constitute a regional 
problem, but this does not inherently justify national regulation.37 
In such cases, regional solutions, such as the creation of regional 
entities or congressionally authorized interstate compacts, may be 
in order.38 The same is true in the context of water pollution, 
where pollution may permeate a regional watershed without 
affecting the nation as a whole. Adopting uniform national 
regulations in such contexts can produce the same type of 
jurisdictional mismatch that occurs when local problems are 
nationalized. 
Not all spillovers take the form of State A externalizing the 
costs of polluting activities onto State B. In some cases, States A 
and B share in a common resource, such as a watershed or airshed. 
The Chesapeake Bay watershed, for example, spans from southern 
New York down through Virginia and the southern tip of 
36 An exception to this problem may be where the harms are reciprocal. In 
this case, the two jurisdictions each have an incentive to negotiate environmental 
controls. 
37 See Haddock, supra note 34, at 15; see also Revesz, supra note 5, at 541 
("[T]he [interstate externality] rationale calls only for a response specific to the 
problem."). 
38 Examples of such entities would include the Ozone Transport 
Commission, created under the Clean Air Act of 1970 § 176(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7506(a) (2000), to address interstate ozone transport concerns in the eastern 
half of the United States, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, authorized 
under the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233, 
3235 (1980). See also, JEROME C. MUYS, NAT'L WATER COMM'N, LEGAL STUDY 
No. 14, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND 
FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT (1971). 
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Maryland.39 In such contexts the spillover effect is reciprocal, 
insofar as each state that shares in the common resource has the 
ability to externalize the effects of its polluting or resource-
depleting activities on the others, and a "tragedy of the commons" 
is likely to result. 40 
As with the more direct spillover, however, one cannot 
reasonably expect states, acting alone, to adopt welfare-enhancing 
environmental protections as the regulating state will bear a 
disproportionate share of the costs from such regulation with no 
guarantee of reaping proportionate benefits. Some form of federal 
intervention, whether it be direct regulation or dispute resolution in 
federal court or some other forum, is necessary to ensure the 
proper level of environmental protection. Even if the relevant 
states are capable of negotiating an interstate compact to protect 
the common resource,41 federal action would be required to 
authorize the compact.42 
Similarly, where spillovers are not only interstate, but 
intemational, there is a justification for federal involvement. 
Indeed, there would be a justification for international intervention 
but for the relative absence of effective intemational institutions. 
39 See Chesapeake Bay Program, Watersheds, http://www.chesapeakebay.net 
/wshed.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
40 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
( 1968). While Hardin is usually credited with identifying the "tragedy of the 
commons," the tragic dynamic of open-access common pool resources was 
identified earlier by fishery economists H: Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott. See 
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic The01y of a Common-Property Resource: The 
FishelJ', 62 J. PoL. EcoN. 124, 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishe1y: The 
Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116, 116 (1955). Gordon and 
Scott themselves were not the first to make this observation. Aristotle made the 
same point quite a bit earlier. See ARlSTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 126lb, at 44 
(Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) ("[T]hat which is common to the 
greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it."). 
41 See, e.g., Oates, supra note 12, at 4 (noting theoretical possibility of 
"Coasean-type negotiations" to resolve interstate spillover problems); Ilya 
Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial 
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461,475-76 
(2002) (suggesting that states can bargain to resolve such spillovers). 
42 The "compacts clause" requires congressional approval of interstate 
compacts. See U.S. CoN ST. art. I, § I 0, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the 
Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State."). 
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B. National Public Goods 
Not all interstate externalities are the result of pollution 
spillovers. There are also externalities created by the existence of 
interstate or national "public goods." Insofar as certain ecological 
resources located in some states provide non-excludable benefits to 
residents in other states, these goods are likely to be 
underprovided. Just as private firms in a competitive market may 
undersupply goods that produce benefits for which they cannot 
charge, individual states may underproduce environmental goods, 
such as national parks or species habitat, that provide substantial 
uncompensated benefits to residents in other states. For example, 
prairie potholes in South Dakota perform various ecological 
functions. Some of these functions, such as providing habitat for 
migratory waterfowl, may provide substantial benefits to residt:;nts 
of other states for which South Dakota is not compensated. As a 
result, South Dakota lacks the incentive to provide sufficient 
protection for prairie potholes. Similarly, insofar as the existence 
of Yellowstone National Park provides benefits to all American 
citizens for which Wyoming and Montana are not compensated, 
Wyoming and Montana lack sufficient incentive to invest in 
conserving the park. 43 Recent empirical research finds some 
evidence that states free-ride and underinvest in conservation of 
species habitat where the benefits of such action would accrue, at 
least in part, to other states.44 
The existence of national public goods may justify federal 
action. Yet beyond that which might be necessary to protect a 
public good from external harm, 45 the mere existence of such a 
public good does not necessarily justify federal regulation. The 
traditional means by which governments at any level provide for 
public goods is through their power to tax and spend. As a general 
matter, governments do not require individual landowners to 
donate their land for use as military installations or parks.46 
43 Of course, to the extent that out-of-state residents benefit from the 
existence of a park by visiting it, and states can charge for access, this problem is 
reduced. 
44 See John A. List et al., "Beggar Thy Neighbor:" Testing for Free Riding 
in State-Level Endangered Species Expenditures, 111 PUB. CHOICE 303, 312-13 
(2002). 
45 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (2000) (provisions to "to preserve, protect, 
and enhance the air quality in national parks"). 
46 Of course, part of the controversy surrounding "regulatory takings" arises 
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Rather, the government generates revenue through taxes, bond 
issues, or some other mechanism and uses some portion of these 
funds to pay for the provision of the public good in question by 
acquiring the relevant land parcel, protecting its boundaries, 
maintaining it, and so on. 47 
It should be noted that just because a given environmental 
amenity meets the traditional economic definition of a public good 
does not mean that it will not be provided privately, or that 
governments at any level can be reliedupon to provide an optimal 
amount of the good in question. Even textbook examples of public 
goods, such as lighthouses, have been provided privately,48 as have 
many environmental amenities, including species habitat.49 Ducks 
Unlimited, for example, has conserved over eleven million acres of 
migratory bird habitat, relying primarily on private donations.50 
The point here is simply that the interstate character of some 
environmental public goods can provide a theoretical justification 
from the claim that government regulations require individual landowners to 
· provide public goods, such as open space or species habitat, at private expense. 
See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The 
"Living Constitution, " the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 
30 ENVTL. L. 769, 786 (2000); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the 
Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CuMB. 
L. REV. 1, 60-66 (1993); Brian F. Mannix, The Origin of Endangered Species 
and the Descent of Man (With Apologies to Mr. Danvin), AM. ENTERPRISE, 
Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 56, 59; Robert J. Smith, The Endangered Species Act: Saving 
Species or Stopping Growth?, REGULATION, Winter 1992, at 83. 
47 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental 
Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 205, 235-36 (2001) (providing 
examples of federal funding for interstate environmental public goods, such as 
habitat for migratory birds). 
48 See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 357, 
363-65 (1974). See also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: 
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 160-67 (1998) (discussing the private provision 
of public goods). For examples specific to the environmental context, see Robert 
J. Smith, Pn"vate Solutions to Conservation Problems, in THE THEORY OF 
MARKET F AlLURE: A CRITICAL EXAMJNATION 341 (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988). 
49 See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Wate1jowl, and the Menace of Mr. 
Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland 
Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 59-62 (1999) [hereinafter Adler, Wetlands] 
(discussing non-governmental provision of wetlands and species habitat); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of 
Property Rights & Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
(forthcoming 2006). · 
50 DUCKS UNLIMITED, DUCKS UNLIMITED ANNuAL REPORT 2004, at 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.ducks.org/about/2004Annua1Report/05%20Annual% 
20Report-%20Main.pdf. 
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for some form of federal intervention. 
C. Economies of Scale 
Another argument for federal involvement in environmental 
policy is that there are economies of scale in the provision of 
certain government function:s. 51 The claim is that it may be more 
efficient to perform certain functions at the federal level, for the 
country as a whole, rather than separately in each state. Yet there 
do not appear to be economies of scale in environmental 
regulation. Regulations have to be implemented and enforced at 
the state and local level irrespective of whether they are developed 
and designed in Washington, D.C.52 As Professors Butler and 
Macey conclude, "whatever the economies of scale associated with 
the centralization of environmental policy, they are surely 
overwhelmed by the diseconomies of scale in centralized 
administration."53 Nonetheless, there may well be economies of 
scale in other aspects of environmental protection. There are two 
readily apparent contexts in which economies of scale may justify 
federal action. First, economies of scale could justify substantial 
federal support of scientific research, data collection, and technical 
analyses on environmental issues. Second, economies of scale 
may justify federal regulation of products bought and sold in 
interstate commerce. 
1. Scientific Research 
There are defmite economies of scale in some types of 
scientific research that can inform the development of 
environmental policy at all levels of government. While much of 
the information required for effective environmental protection is 
local in nature, much of the relevant scientific knowledge will 
have nationwide utility.54 In this respect, much scientific research 
51 Economies of scale are a reduction in the per-unit cost of producing agood 
(or providing a service) due an increase in production. See MIT DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN ECONOMICS 122 (David Pearce ed., 1992) (defining "economies of 
scale" as "[r]eductions in the AVERAGE COST of a product in the LONG RUN, 
resulting from an expanded level of output"). 
52 As Huffman observes, "[e]nforcement is inherently local." Huffman, 
supra note 5, at 1378. 
53 BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27. 
54 See CO:MM. ON ASSESSMENT OF WATER REs. RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, CONFRONTJNG THE NATION'S WATER PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF 
RESEARCH 68 (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309092582/ 
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generated for environmental protection has aspects of a public 
good.55 For example, the weather conditions and topographical 
features that influence ozone formation will vary from place-to-
place, but the underlying chemical reactions and effects of ozone 
on human respiratory systems and other living organisms will not. 
Insofar as the latter is relevant for environmental policy decisions 
in all areas affected by ozone pollution, it may be more efficient to 
conduct such research at the federal level and make it available to 
those jurisdictions where such information can be put to good use. 
Were each state required to conduct its own environmental 
scientific research, there could be much duplication and 
inefficiency.56 In addition, there are likely to be scale economies 
in the resources and technical expertise required for some fonns of 
scientific research. 
Even where a given problem is particularly local in nah1re, 
such as the protection of a mtmicipal drinking water system, there 
is still a case for federal research-or at least federally supported 
and coordinated research-into the risks posed by various 
contaminants, likely sources of contamination, means of 
decontamination, and the like.57 It fmiher makes sense for the 
federal govenunent to provide at least some "expertise" on the 
htm1/R1.html ("A federal role is appropriate in those research areas where the 
benefits of such research are widely dispersed and do not accrue only to those 
who fund the research."). 
55 See Oates, supra note 12, at 20-21 ("Basic lmowledge concerning the 
nah1re and extent of environmental damages from polluting activities and 
methods of pollution control are pure public goods on a national (and 
international) scale . . . . The basic research function and, in addition, the 
dissemination of information on environmental damages and pollution-control 
techniques thus has a public-good character that points to a fundamental role for 
the central government."). 
56 See Esty, supra note 3, at 614-15 ("Absent centralized functions, 
iJ1dependent state regulators will either duplicate each other's analytic work or 
engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient 
division of technical labor."). Of course it is possible that "competition" could 
iJnprove scientific research insofar as different entities pursue different research 
methodologies to address emerging environmental problems. 
57 See Revesz, supra note 5, at 543 ("The economies-of-scale argument is 
most plausible in the early stages of the regulatory process, particularly with 
respect to the deterniination of the adverse effects of particular pollutants through 
risk assessment."); see also, Terry M. Dinan et a!., Environmental Federalism: 
Welfare Losses from Unifonn National Drinking Water Standards, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E. 
OATES 29 (Arvind Panagariya eta!. eds., 1999). 
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technical aspects of regulation,58 investigating such matters as 
regulatory design and implementation. 59 Duplicating this sort of 
research at the state level would serve little purpose and divert 
resources from other environmental priorities. 
Not all research and data collection should be conducted at 
the federal level, however. Some research and data collection is 
probably best left in state and local hands. In some cases, over-
centralization of scientific research may increase the risks of 
political manipulation of science. Professor Esty, for one, makes 
the case for broad federal involvement in this area, stating that "[i]t 
makes no sense to ask every state, city, or town to measure the 
level, size, and type of particulates in the air, determine their 
connection to respiratory failure and other he.alth problems, 
identify the safe level of einissions, and design cost-effective 
policy responses."60 
As a general matter, his argument holds tme. However, this 
argument may also conflate research in which there are likely to be 
scale economies with local data collection, where the case for 
federal action will be less strong. Unless one assumes that all 
localities should adopt the same environmental measures 
irrespective of their local conditions, it may well make sense for 
each local jurisdiction to "measure the level, size, and type of 
particulates in the air,"61 as such data are necessary to help 
determine whether and what kind of pollution control is warranted. 
This is not duplicative insofar as different regions have different 
ecological conditions. Yet even though there is a case for the local 
collection of data about local conditions, Professor Esty is correct 
that local research into health effects, safe exposure thresholds, 
and potential control strategies could be duplicative. Accordingly, 
such research may be conducted more efficiently at the federal 
level. Moreover, federal efforts to ensure the consistency and 
reliability of state and local data collection efforts would maximize 
the national benefits from such local research, further justifying 
federal support of local research and data collection. 
58 Oates, supra note 12, at 22. 
59 See Esty, supra note 3, at 615 ("[T]he smaller the regulating entity, the 
more likely it is to suffer from the absence of scientific scale economies."). 
60 ld. at 614. 
61 ld. 
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2. Product Standards 
There may be economies of scale in some types of regulation 
that make a single federal standard more efficient than a 
multiplicity of state standards. Specifically, a single set of 
regulations may make more sense for a single, integrated national 
economy. 62 This argument is strongest in the case of product 
regulation. 63 Where a given product is bought and sold in national 
markets, and will travel throughout interstate commerce, it is less 
costly to design and produce the product so as to confonn with a 
single national standard. 64 While it is not clear why pulp mill 
siting standards in V ennont should match those in Oregon or 
Mississippi, if cmmnercial goods are going to be produced on a 
national scale for national markets, producers may be best served 
if there is a single product standard that applies nationwide.65 
Facility siting and construction will always be subject to local 
requirements, but that is not necessarily the case with consumer 
products. In addition, consumers may benefit from national 
product standards, insofar as lower compliance costs result in 
lower consumer prices. Allowing states to adopt more stringent 
product standards of their own poses the risk of one state 
extemalizing the costs of its environmental preferences onto out-
of-state market participants. For instance, if Califomia and several 
northeastem states adopt more stringent emission standards for 
62 See, e.g., NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 17 ("Business interests, not 
without justification, often prefer nationwide regulatory standards to a 
hodgepodge of local rules: broad scope and standardization may lower 
uncertainty and increase efficiency."); SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 218 
(defending federal regulation of pesticide safety because pesticides are 
"nationally distributed"). 
63 Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the 
United States: The Risks of Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 137 (Daniel C. Esty & 
Damien Geradin eds., 2001) ("Uniform national regulation may produce 
economies of scale of production and distribution for firms selling nationally."). 
64 See, e.g., Oates, supra note 12, at 21 ("It would obviously be very costly 
for auto manufacturers to have to produce 50 different variants of cars to satisfY 
the particular emissions standards of each state."). 
65 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 173 ("[W]hile automakers and fuel producers 
prefer national regulatory uniformity, stationary sources have just the opposite 
interest."). But see, Revesz, supra note 5, at 544 (noting that the argument for 
uniformity is "less compelling in the case of process standards"); Esty, supra 
note 3, at 618 (noting federal uniform product standards, but not process 
standards, "can create important economies of scale for businesses selling these 
products"). 
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automobiles, and this produces a de facto national standard that 
increases production costs, consumers in other states may end up 
bearing a portion of the costs of more polluted states' preference 
for cleaner vehicles. 66 
While this argument has some force, it is likely that it has 
been oversold. If anything, the costs of meeting a multiplicity of 
product standards has declined over time. In _the 1970s it was 
certainly the case that varied state tailpipe emission standards 
would have increased the cost of automobiles nationwide. At the 
time, it would have been difficult for a single factory in Detroit to 
tum out vehicles matching the preferences and requirements of 
each state. Today, however, in an era of just-in-time inventory 
and customized manufacturing, it is not clear that' these premises 
apply. Product customization is increasingly common in many 
major industries, including automobile manufacture.67 Consumers 
regularly order products; such as home computers, tailor-made to 
their specifications. 68 If products can be produced for individual 
consumers, production to meet a dozen or more different state 
standards cannot be much of a problem.69 Tailoring products to 
meet state standards does not necessarily require manufacturing 
66 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 17 (noting adoption of emission regulations in 
California may "force" automakers to comply with the standard nationwide 
"since it is not feasible to produce two separate sets of cars"). 
67 See B. JOSEPH PINE II, MASS CUSTOMIZATION: THE NEW FRONTIER IN 
BUSINESS COMPETITION 36 (1993) ("The entire [automobile production] process, 
from order to delivery-including production, not just movement from 
inventory-is heading toward full customization."). "Mass customization 
generally refers to the manufacture of one-of-a-kind, 'custom' products via the 
use of flexible, computer-controlled mass-production machinery." Eric von 
Hippe!, Economics of Product Development by Users: The Impact of "Sticky" 
Local Information, 44 MGMT. SCI. 629,631 (1998). 
68 The most obvious example of this is Dell Computers Dell is "THE 
model for inass customization." Matthew J. Turosz, Mass Customization 
a Long Winding Road, KIPLINGER Bus. FORECASTS, Jul. 30, 2001, 
http://www.kiplingerforecasts.com. Other industries in which mass 
customization is increasing range from clothing to candy. See Diane Brady, 
Customizing for the Masses, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 2000, at 130B; Julie Scholosser, 
Cashing in on the New World of Me, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 244. 
69 This does not mean that mass production of standardized products isn't 
less expensive due to economies of scale; it certainly is. See PINE, supra note 67, 
at 47-48 (noting that "the benefits of low prices owing to economies of scale and 
other cost advantages of mass production are never overcome"). Rather, it is that 
the marginal cost of tailoring products to different market segments has dropped 
dramatically, and that the technologies and management structures that allow for 
mass customization make it feasible and cost-effective to produce state-specific 
products in many industries. 
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items from scratch. The emergence of electronic emission 
controls, for example, could allow manufacturers to tailor vehicle 
emissions to the particular demands of specific regional markets. 70 
Given these technological advances and resulting changes in 
product markets, state-specific product standards may not 
necessarily allow one state to externalize the costs of its 
environmental preferences on another.71 
A related concern is that the proliferation of state product 
standards will inhibit interstate commerce. A multiplicity of 
variable mles could sufficiently burden commerce in some goods 
and services as to become an obstacle to interstate trade. Insofar 
as states may seek to adopt environmental measures that facially 
discriminate against out-of-state producers, such measures are 
already barred by the dormant commerce clause.72 Additionally, 
the Pike test further bars those state measures which unduly burden 
interstate commerce.73 Whatever the merits of current dormant 
commerce clause doctrine, so long as courts continue to enforce 
these prohibitions, the ability of states to dismpt interstate 
commerce will be limited. Nonetheless, further federal action to 
encourage uniformity may be justified in some contexts. 
70 See Andrew P. Morriss et a!., Regulating by Litigation: The EPA's 
Regulation of Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 56 ADMJN. L. REv. 403, 438--40 
(2004) (discussing emergence of cost-effective, programmable electronic vehicle 
emission controls). 
71 The imposition of national product standards also creates opportunities for 
rent-seeking, as economic interests seek to gain competitive advantage by 
encouraging the adoption of standards that benefit their products and 
disadvantage those of their competitors. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Watching 
Paint D1y, 18 REGULATION, Fall 1995, at 23 (describing how national paint 
manufacturers sought to use federal standards for evaporative emissions from 
paint to disadvantage regional competitors). 
72 See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARv. 
ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2003) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's dormant 
commerce clause decisions affecting environmental regulation). 
73 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the 
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits."). See also, e.g., Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 393-95 (1983) (applying the Pike test). 
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D. Race to the Bottom 
.One of the more prominent arguments for greater federal 
intervention is that the lack of a federal regulatory "floor" will 
result in a destructive "race to the bottom," in which states adopt 
suboptimally lax environinental protections in a futile effort to 
attract off-setting levels of economic investment. 74 As commonly 
explained, this competition creates downward pressure as each 
state seeks to attract business by reducing its environmental 
safeguards below the levels maintained by competing jurisdictions. 
As Professor Richard Stewart observed three decades ago, "[i]f 
each locality reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower 
standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there 
were some binding mechanism that enabled theni simultaneously 
to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of 
industry or development."75 Thus, the theory goes, interstate 
competition will result in suboptimally lax environmental 
regulations even where there are not direct spillovers from one 
jurisdiction into another. 
One immediate problem with the race to the bottom theory is 
its static view of the trade-off between economic development and 
environmental protection. Insofar as it is possible to reduce the 
costs of environmental regulation without sacrificing existing 
levels of environmental protection, government efforts to create a 
more business-friendly regulatory climate need not produce 
74 See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22-25 
(2003) (noting that the race-to-the-bottom theory is "one of the central 
underpinnings of federal environmental regulation"); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE 
HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) (noting "a widespread belief that 
competition among jurisdictions poses a danger of a mutually destructive 'race to 
the bottom"'); Esty, supra note 3, at 628 ("Fears of a welfare-reducing race to 
the bottom represent one of the central underpinnings of federal environmental 
regulation in the United States."). Perhaps the ftrst to suggest the "race to the 
bottom" justification for federal environmental regulation was Richard Stewart. 
See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977). See also Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental 
Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 271, 367-74 (1997); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in 
Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 67, 68, 107 
(1996). 
~ . 
Stewart, supra note 74, at 1212. 
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suboptimal levels of environmental protection. 76 At the same time, 
business interests often have their own reasons for supporting 
greater levels of environmental protection, 77 including the effect of 
environmental conditions on labor supply. States are not only 
competing for industry, but for workers and taxpayers as well. 
Moreover, as incomes rise, so does the demand for environmental 
protection, so states that fail to maintain high levels of 
environmental protection risk driving away· residents to other 
states.78 
Additional problems with the race-to-the-bottom theory have 
been identified by Professor Richard L. Revesz. 79 First, as Revesz 
points out, there is no reason to assume that interjurisdictional 
competition in environinental policy is any less likely to produce 
optimal results or is otherwise less reliable than such competition 
in other contexts.80 While it is plausible that interjurisdctional 
competition could produce suboptimal results due to game 
theoretic interactions, there is no a priori reason to assume that the 
result would be state standards that are suboptimally lax, rather 
than sub optimally stringent. 81 Assuming that there is a race to the 
76 This argument is made in greater detail in Adler, supra note 47, at 226. 
77 Of course, sometimes business interests support environmental regulation 
for rent-seeking reasons. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty 
Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL 
ENV1RONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1, 2 (Terry L. 
Anderson ed., 2000) ("As the costs of environmental regulations increase, so 
does the value of potential comparative advantages that environmental 
regulations can create. Seeking regulatory policies that will carve out niche 
markets or inhibit competitors becomes ... increasingly profitable."); Todd J. 
Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The_Political 
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REv. 845, 856-
873 (1999) (describing various examples of industrial rent-seeking in the context 
of environmental regulation); ENV1RONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, 
PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
78 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 706 (1995) 
("Residents have flocked to some western states that use aggressive measures to 
protect the environment-despite the fact that these laws impose significant costs 
on business and taxpayers."). 
79 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking 
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992). 
80 See id. at 1211-12. 
81 See id. at 1241-42. Advocates of the race-to-the-bottom theory also 
acknowledge this. point. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 74, at 345 ("[I]t is unclear 
whether this . strategic interaction prompts states to establish more or less 
stringent standards."). It is also possible that, in some circumstances, the 
adoption of a federal regulatory "floor" could result in less state regulation, and 
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"bottom," and that state standards are insufficiently stringent, 
federal regulation might not solve the problem. Environmental 
regulation is not the only variable in which states compete for 
business investment.82 If a federal standard prevents competition 
in environmental standards, states will compete in other areas. 
Indeed, if the race-to-the-bottom argument can justify federal 
environmental standards, it could justify the federalization of just 
about everything. 
Another problem with the race to the bottom theory, as noted 
by economist William Fischel, is the dominant role of homeowners 
in local politics, which can often produce a ''Not in My Back 
Yard" ("NIMBY") reaction to proposed changes ,in land use. 83 
Homeowners tend to be very risk averse about local changes or 
developments that have the potential to depress land values, and 
this risk aversion "pervades all of local political decisions. "84 
Even those homeowners who are not particularly concerned about 
the environmental effects of proposed developments or industrial 
activities are likely to recognize that prospective buyers might 
be. 85 As a result, Fischel goes so far as to argue that local 
governments are "the least likely candidates for a 'race to the 
bottom' of the environmental ladder" and that "local governments 
are, if anything, inclined to accept too little garden-variety 
industry" and other environmentally harmfulland-uses.86 
Theory aside, empirical evidence of a race to the bottom in 
environmental policy is conspicuously lacking.87 While there are 
some studies finding that the stringency of environmental 
regulation can affect industry siting decisions,88 and survey data 
indicating that such effects may influence state-level 
environmental policy decisions, 89 the available empirical evidence 
even less aggregate environmental protection, than if the federal regulations were 
not adopted. See Jonathan H. Adler, Why States Regulate: The Impact of 
Federal Action on State Regulatory Choices (draft, on file with author). 
82 See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A 
Normative Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 
105-07 (John Ferejohn & BarryR. Weingast eds., 1997). 
83 FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 163. 
84 Id. 
~ 5 Id. at 163-64 
86 !d. at 163, 183. 
87 See Oates, supra note 12, at 11-17 (summarizing empirical literature). 
88 See id. at 15~16. 
89 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 74, at 340-47. 
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cannot sustain the claim that interjurisdictional competitiOn 
produces suboptimally lax environmental regulation. 90 The fact 
that many states adopted federal regulation in advance of the 
federal government, and that in some cases those states with the 
most to lose from regulation were the first to act,91 would strongly 
suggest otherwise. Further evidence suggests that, at least in some 
environmental contexts, any "race" among jurisdictions is "to the 
top," as states seem more likely to increase their environmental 
efforts in response to neighboring jurisdictions' actions than to 
relax regulation.92 Moreover, some states may rationally opt to 
reduce environmental protection in one area so as to facilitate 
greater environmental gains in another context. This is evidence 
of variable state preferences, not a race to the "bottom" of 
environmental protection. In short, despite its prominence in 
environmental policy discussions, the "race-to-the-bottom" theory 
is not a particularly strong basis upon which to rest the case for 
federal intervention. 
E. Interest Groups and Institutional Competence 
There may be other institutional or public choice reasons to 
expect state and local govemments to be less able to address 
environmental concems than the federal government, even in the 
absence of spillovers or economies of scale. For instance, some 
argue that collective action problems and the threat of special 
interest influences are greater at the state than federal level.93 
90 Several economic studies have failed to find empirical evidence of any 
race to the bottom in environmental policy. See, e.g., DanielL. Millimet & Jolm 
A List, A Natural Experiment on the 'Race to the Bottom' Hypothesis: Testing 
for Stochastic Dominance in Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 OXFORD BULL. 
EcoN. & STAT. 395 (2003); Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact 
of Environmental Federalism, 43 J. REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003); John A List & 
Shelby Gerking, Regulat01y Federalism and Environmental Protection in the 
United States, 40 J. REGIONAL Sci. 453 (2000). 
91 See, Adler, Wetlands, supra note 49, at 47-53. 
92 See Oates, supra note 12, at I 5 ("States appear to be 'pulled' to higher 
levels of abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighbouring states, 
but relatively lax regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such 
expenditures."); TESKE, supra note 21, at 180-81 (fmding states are more likely 
to increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions 
taken in neighboring states, and concluding that tllis "suggests that the race to the 
bottom is not a factor here"); id. at 191-92 (fmding the same pattern in 
groundwater regulation). 
93 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 3, at 597-98; Stewart, supra note 74, at 1213. 
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While there are certainly collective action problems at the state 
level that inhibit the adoption of environmental measures, there is 
no reason to assume that such problems are lesser at the national 
level. If anything, given wide diversity in environmental problems 
and ~references across the country, the opposite is likely to be 
true. 4 More important, as with the "race-to-the-bottom" theory, 
the empirical evidence that states face particularly acute public 
choice problems is lacking.95 • 
·Whatever the imperfections of state and local governments-
and there are many-these "flawed institutions" were the first to 
address air pollution and other environmental problems.96 
Historically, state and local governments began to address most 
major environmentalproblems well before the federal government 
got into the act. As knowledge and awareness of specific 
environmental problems and their causes accumulated, state and 
local governments began to act. In the six years following 
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Springn-arguably the book 
most responsible for awakening the nation's environmental 
consciousness98-states with air pollution laws increased from 
sixteen to forty-six.99 This change was driven by a shift in public 
opinion. For example, the percentage of Americans who believed 
air pollution to be a serious problem increased from 28 percent in 
1965 to 69 percent by 1970. 10° Cities like Pittsburgh adopted local 
measures to address air quality precisely because the federal 
government (and, at the time, state governments) was unwilling to 
act. 101 Interestingly enough, such measures were adopted with the 
94 See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 46-47. 
95 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REv. 553 (2001) 
(presenting empirical data that challenges the view that states are ineffective 
environmental regulators); see also, TESKE, supra note 21, at 165-92. 
96 SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 221-22. 
97 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
98 Silent Spring is not without its share of critics, even to this day. See, e.g, 
CHARLES T. RUBIN, THE GREEN CRUSADE: RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM 29-52 (1994). 
99 SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 10 (citing MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING 
AFTER EARTH DAY: THE PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 44 (1999)). 
100 S. ROBERT LICHTER & STANLEY ROTHMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER-A 
POLITICAL DISEASE? 9 (1999). 
101 See FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 168-69; see also ROY LUBOVE, 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PITTSBURGH: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 106-.Q?, 114-19 (1969). 
156 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 14 
support of local business leaders, not over their opposition; indeed, 
in the 1940s U.S. Steel threatened to leave Pittsburgh because 
there was too little air pollution control. 102 This instance was not 
an aberration; several other local governments recognized the need 
to adopt environmental measures so as to prevent industrial flight 
to cleaner jurisdictions.103 
Today, state capacity and willingness to address 
environmental problems remains substantial. The nation's state 
environmental agencies employ approximately 60,000 people, over 
three times the number employed by the EP A. 104 State 
environmental agencies also perform the majority of inspections 
and enforcement actions. 105 Moreover, states exceed federal 
minimum standards in many areas. While there are cases in which 
state environmental policy decisions are influenced by rent-
seeking and interest group politics, 106 this is no less true at the 
federal level. Indeed, in some cases industry groups seek federal 
regulation to preempt potentially more stringent state and local 
rules. 107 Empirical studies of state regulatory activity generally 
fail to support the claim that state governments are more 
susceptible to interest group pressure than the federal 
102 FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 169. As Fischel notes, this "turns the 
conventional 'race to the bottom' scenario on its head," as local governments had 
to enact more stringent environmental measures to keep local industry. Jd. 
103 !d. at 169-70; cf INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY 
OF THEW AR ON AIR POLLUTION (1999); Arthur C. Stem, Hist01y of Air Pollution 
Legislation in the United States, 32 1. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 44, 44 
(1982). . 
104 NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 30 (statistics quoted are -accurate as 
of2001). 
105 David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a 
"Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide BelYveen TheOI)' and 
Reality, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 32 (2000) (states are responsible for up to 
90 percent of all facility inspections and environmental enforcement actions); 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-113, EPA's AND STATES' 
EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS 16 (1998), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98113.pdf (noting that states 
accounted for 85 percent of enforcement actions in 1996). 
106 See supra note 77. 
107 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a The01y of Statutory Evolution: The 
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313,330-33 (1985); 
see also Revesz, supra note 95 at 577 (noting that industry will, at times, seek 
federal preemption of more stringent state standards); TESKE, supra note 21, at 
17 (citing examples of business support of federal regulation to preempt state 
regulation). 
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Ill. JURISDICTIONAL MISMATCH 
Turning to the present state of environmental policy, the 
division of authority and responsibility in environmental policy 
does not comport with the analytical framework sketched above. 
Nor does it comport with any particular analytical framework or 
theory of the proper federal-state balance in environmental policy. 
Rather, it is the result of an almost haphazard accretion of 
regulatory statutes ·over the past several decades. 109 The result is a 
. mismatch between the analytical bases for federal intervention and 
the actual contours of federal intervention in environmental 
policy-a jurisdictional mismatch that is greater than that which 
would be caused by the failure of legal and political jurisdictions 
to track the scope and extent of various environmental concerns. 
This mismatch has significant consequences for environmental 
protection. It is inefficient and, at times, environmentally harmful. 
As illustrated by the examples that follow, the jurisdictional 
mismatch in environmental policy has hampered environmental 
protection in some significant respects. 
A. ·Federal Action 
The federal government is intensely involved in myriad 
environmental problems that are truly local in character. Drinking 
water, underground storage tanks, and hazardous waste sites are all 
problems that lack the features that would justify . federal 
regulation, yet federal requirements for such intrastate concerns 
are sometimes more stringent than mandates to prevent interstate 
harms. 110 Even where a federal role can be justified, as in the case 
of air pollution that may drift across jurisdictional lines, the federal 
108 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 196 ("[C]omplete capture of state regulation 
is rare and usually limited in time."). 
109 Some of this accretion is itself the result of haphazard or accidental events. 
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History 
of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002) (discussing the 
role of an accidental 1969 river fire in spurring passage of the Clean Water Act 
and other federal environmental laws). 
110 See NIVOLA & SHJELDS, supra note 15, at 35 (noting that federal authority 
mandating waste site cleanups is stronger than those provisions addressing 
interstate air and water pollution in the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, 
respectively). 
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government's involvement does not COITespond with the federal 
government's interest. For example, cunent federal air quality 
regulations focus far more on whether a given metropolitan area 
meets national ambient air quality standards and on the 
development state plans to meet such standards than on interstate 
air pollution.111 Moreover, those provisions targeted at such 
spillovers have only rarely been invoked with any success. 
Regulation of drinking water quality is perhaps the 
paradigmatic example of a local enviromnental concern regulated 
under federal law. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act 
("SDW A"), the federal government sets maximum thresholds for 
identified contaminants with which all local water systems must 
comply. 112 Although variances from federal standards are 
available in some instances, 113 as a practical matter, the SDW A 
sets uniform drinking water standards for the entire nation. 
Federal drinking water standards cannot be justified on the 
grounds of interstate spillovers, as drinking water quality in one 
community seldom, if ever, has an effect upon drinking water in 
neighboring jurisdictions, let alone states half a nation away. 114 
Both the costs and benefits of more protective standards fall on 
users of the drinking water system. 115 Accordingly, state and local 
governments made "significant strides" to improve drinking water 
111 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (noting that the 
State Implementation Plan provisions are the "heart" of the Clean Air Act). As a 
practical matter, it may be more accurate to say that the primary federal focus is 
on the existence of State Implementation Plans for meeting the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards, rather than on the actual attainment of the standards. See 
generally COMM. ON AIR QUALITY MGMT. U.S., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNJTED STATES (2004) (noting significant 
progress in developing SIPs, and NAAQSs, as well limited success in attaining 
NAAQSs). 
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(l)(A) (2000). 
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4 (2000) (providing for variances from national 
primary drinking water regulations). 
114 See Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy in the Next Centwy, in 
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECTION AND BEYOND 359, 379 
(Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999) ("[F]or all but a few 
biological contaminants in drinking water, the risks linked with higher 
concentrations of most contaminants would be borne only by those who consume 
the affected water for a lifetime."). 
115 See Terry M. Dinan et a!., Environmental Federalism: Welfare Losses 
ji-om Uniform National Drinldng Water Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E. OATES 13, 14 (Arvind 
Panagariya et al. eds., 1999). 
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~ protection before the passage of the federal SDW A.116 While 
federal standards were adopted, in part, due to concerns that local 
efforts may have been underprotective, the imposition of 
nationally uniform drinking water standards may have produced 
large net welfare losses) 17 
Drinking water is a local good produced by local ·water 
systems, so there are no economies of scale in the setting of 
uniform national standards. If states lack the expertise to identify 
the proper contaminant thresholds, it would justify the 
promulgation of federal guidelines to better inform local decision-
making.118 It would not, however, justify imposition of a federal 
rule. Similarly, if state and local governments lack the capacity to 
monitor and maintain drinking water quality, this could justify 
financial and technical support from the federal ·government, but 
not mandatory standards. 119 
· Other justifications for federally imposed standards on local 
drinking water systems are equally unavailing. For instance, were 
one to accept the race to the bottom theory as a justification for 
federal environmental regulation generally, it would not justify the 
federal regulation of drinking water, as the imposition of local 
drinking water standards does not, in itself, increase compliance 
costs for local industry. 120 Insofar as local communities adopt less 
stringent drinking water standards than those who live elsewhere 
may like, the communities themselves bear the brunt of the risk. A 
116 Id. at 27. 
117 Id. at 27-28. While recent SDWA reforms may reduce the welfare losses 
from uniform standards, they will not eliminate them. !d. at 28. 
118 See id. at 29. 
119 It may also be relevant that bottled water represents an increasing 
proportion of American water consumption, diminishing the perceived 
importance of federal regulation in this area. According to the International 
Bottled Water Association ("IBWA"), per capita annual bottled water 
consumption increased ten-fold from 1976 to 1999, from 1.6 gallons to 
17 gallons. See lNT'L BOTTLED WATER ASSOC., U.S. BOTTLED WATER 
MARKET VOLUME, GROWTH, CONSUI\1PTION: 1976-1999 {2002), 
http://www.bottledwater.org/public/BWFactsHome_main.htrn. 
120 Under the Federal Superfund statute, drinking water standards can form 
the basis for waste site cleanup standards, and therefore more stringent drinking 
water standards could trigger more stringent cleanup requirements. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9621(d){2){A)(i) (2000). This is a function of federal law, however, and not 
inherent in the regulation of drinking water quality. Moreover, the basic 
structure of the SDWA was put in place in 1974, years before enactment of the 
Federal Superfund statute, and therefore could not serve as a justification for the 
federal presence in this area in the first place. 
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transient visitor has little to fear from drinking water that local 
residents ingest 365 days per year. 121 
Drinking water is not the only example of a clearly local 
matter that is regulated by federal law and not justified by 
interstate spillovers or other multi-jurisdictional concerns. Federal 
law governs cleanup standards for local waste sites122 and 
underground storage tanks, 123 as well as air and water quality 
concerns that do not cross jurisdictional lines. 124 Indeed, it is fair 
to say that the bulk of federal environmental regulations on the 
books concern matters that do not directly address interstate 
spillovers or benefit from the sort of economies of scale that would 
justify federal regulation. 
B. Federal Abdication 
While the federal government is hyperactive in its focus on 
local environmental concerns, it is less active in those areas where 
the case for federal involvement is the strongest. The federal 
government is relatively absent when it comes to addressing 
interstate spillovers, and it has been deficient in providing the 
scientific and technical foundation for environmental regulatory 
efforts. The federal government has been more responsible in 
efforts to provide for national public goods, such as national parks 
and the like, though here, too, federal efforts are far from ideal. It 
chronically underfunds National Park maintenance and restoration, 
while spending money '\mwisely and even extravagantly" on new 
constmction.125 The result is substantial pollution and ecological 
degradation of national public goods within federal care. 126 Even 
121 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 177 ("The water that residents provide 
for themselves is generally safe for visitors .... Transients drinking water with 
50 ppb arsenic are probably at much great~r risk from being killed by a toppling 
vending machine while buying a soft drink"). 
122 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
123 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-699Ii (2000). 
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000) (setting National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for local areas); 33 U.S.C. §§ 13 I 1-1313, 1342 (2000) (setting 
effluent limitations and water quality standards for all waters irrespective of 
interstate effects). 
125 See Holly Lippke Fretwell & Michael Podolsky, A Strategy for Restoring 
America's National Paries, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 143, 149-50, 153 
(2003). 
126 For discussions of the impact of this type of neglect on National Parks, 
see, for example, ALSTON CHASE, PLA YJNG GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE 
DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK (1986); KARL HESS, JR., 
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where the federal government manages resources that are not 
necessarily public goods of national importance, the results are 
distressing. One salient example is the management of the 
National Forests, where the federal government loses money on 
timber sales, and chronic mismanagement has led to ecosystem 
decline and a literally explosive threat of catastrophic wildflre. 127 
Federal agencies are also responsible for thousands of 
contaminated waste sites that will likely cost in excess of $250 
billion to clean.128 Compounding the problems with state and local 
environmental efforts, federal facilities are not always subject to 
the same civil penalties for polluting activities as are private 
facilities. 129 
ROCKY TIMES IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 
{1993) (criticizing the gross mismanagement in Rocky Mountain National Park); 
Fretwell & Podolsky, supra note 125, at 149-53 (giving specific examples of 
crumbling infrastructure in National Parks, as well as general degradation of the 
natural resources within those parks). 
127 See Holly Lippke Fretwell, Forests: Do We Get What We Pay For? 
(Prop. & Envtl. Research Ctr., Public Lands Report II, 1999), available 
at http://www.perc.org/perc.php?id=135; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/RCED-99-65, WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS: A COHESIVE STRATEGY 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE THREATS 22-31 (1999), 
available at http://www'.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99065.pdf (noting that an 
estimated 39 million acres of federal lands are at risk of catastrophic wildfire); 
see generally Donald Leal, Turning a Profit on Public Forests (Prop. & Env't 
Research Ctr. Policy Series No. . 4, 1995), available at 
http://www.perc.org/perc.php?id=639 (discussing poor timber profits); ROBERT 
H. NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE (2000) (discussing the threat of catastrophic wildfire due to 
management decisions). 
128 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-150, FEDERAL 
FACILITIES: CONSISTENT RELEVANT RISK EVALUATIONS NEEDED FOR 
PRIORITIZING CLEANUPS 29 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 
1996/rc96150.pdf. See also David Armstrong, Government as Polluter: More 
Costly Cleanup on Horizon, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1999, at A32 (reporting 
costs of cleaning up Department of Defense sites). 
129 See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND 
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 82 (2004) (discussing federal immunity from civil 
penalties under the Clean Water Act); see also Melinda R. Kassen, The 
Inadequacies of Congressional Attempts to Legislate Federal Facility 
Compliance with Environmental Requirements, 54 MD. L. REV. 1475 (1995) 
(discussing federal claims of immunity from civil penalties under RCRA and 
CERCLA). 
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1. · Interstate Spillovers 
Federal intervention is probably most needed to address 
interstate spillover concerns. 130 Only a small portion of current 
federal regulations qan bejustified on these grounds, however. 131 
More significantly,· these provisimis have been invoked only 
rarely, and even then downwind states have been more aggressive 
at seeking to control interstate spillovers than has the federal 
government. For over two decades, the EPA made no significant 
effort to address such concerns, focusing instead on air quality in 
urban centers. As even those who support a fairly aggressive 
federal environmental presence acknowledge, the "EPA has not 
done a very good job of addressing transbotmdary pollution."132 In 
some cases, existing federal environmental laws may have 
exacerbated interstate pollution problems, such as by encouraging 
the use of taller smoke stacks that will send polluting emissions 
further downwind. 133 
While the Clean Air Act contains a few provisions that 
specifically address interstate pollution concerns, the EPA has 
largely ignored these measures. Indeed, where states sought to 
invoke the Act to obtain relief for upwind contributions to local air 
pollution, the EPA refused to act, and federal courts largely 
validated the federal government's desire to ignore interstate air 
pollution. 134 Only recently has the EPA responded to states 
seeking to control emissions from upwind states that contribute to 
downwind nonattainment of federal air quality standards. 135 For 
over two decades, EPA made no significant effort to address such 
concerns, focusing instead on air quality in urban centers.136 The 
Clean Water Act also authorizes the EPA to address trans~oundary 
130 See supra Part II.A. 
131 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental 
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2341, 2347--49 (1998) (noting, for example, 
that "the core of the CleanAir Act" provides "an ineffective and poorly targeted 
means of dealing with the problem of interstate externalities"). 
132 Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or 
Reform?, 31 ENVTL.L.REP. 11086, 11092 (2001). 
133 See Revesz, supra Iiote 5, at 541--42 (noting that the number of stacks 
taller than 500 feet increased from two in 1970 to over 180 in 1985, and arguing 
that this was due, in part, to incentives created by the Clean Air Act of 1970). 
134 See Merrill, supra note 34, at 959. 
135 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
136 See Revesz, supra note 131, at 2349-74. 
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·pollution, but here again the federal government has been largely 
absent, rarely invoking the relevant provisions.137 This federal 
abdication is all the more troubling for state environmental 
protection efforts as federal statutes largely preempt preexisting 
remedies for interstate nuisances under federal common law. 138 
Policymakers may have ·voiced concerns about interstate 
externalities when adopting federal environrhental statues,139 but 
such concerns are scarcely evident in the environmental provisions 
of the U.S. Code as they represent only a tiny portion of federal 
pollution control law. 
2. Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale suggest that the federal government 
should actively fund scientific research about environmental 
problems, collect data, and support the development of pollution 
control strategies, even if they are not imposed on local 
jurisdictions.140 Yet the state of knowledge about environmental 
problems, their causes and extent, remains quite poor. Much 
environmental- regulation has proceeded despite a lack of basic 
data about the nature of current environmental problems and 
incomplete scientific understanding of the problems in question. 
These problems are compounded by the politicization and 
manipulation of science within the regulatory process. 141 While 
state and local governments could benefit from federal research 
identifying the nature and causes of various environmental 
problems, as well as from comparative analyses of potential 
environmental protection policies, they get far less federal support 
of this type than is warranted by the economies of scale in 
scientific research. Given the amount of resources devoted to 
forcing state and local compliance with federal standards, 
particularly federal process standards, this deficiency IS 
137 See Merrill, supra note 34, at 960-61. 
138 See City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see also Robert 
Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of 
Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REv. 717 (2004). 
139 See Esty, supra note 3, at 624 n.l96 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 940117 (1976); 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 (1977)) (stating that Congress considered interstate 
externalities when adopting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). 
140 See supra Part II.A. 
141 See generally E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 45-46 (2003) (describing EPA's "tendency to run 
roughshod over science to follow the political winds"). 
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particularly striking. 
In 197 0, the President's Council on Environmental Quality 
reported that existing government efforts did "not provide the type 
of information or coverage necessary to evaluate the condition of 
the nation's environment or to chart changes in its quality and 
trace their causes."142 Although the federal government spends 
over $600 million each year on environmental data collection, in 
addition to private, state, and local efforts, there is no 
"comprehensive account on the state of the nation's 
ecosystems."143 As noted in a recent report by the Heinz Center 
titled The State of the Nation's Ecosystems, "[f]or a nation deeply 
committed to protecting the environment, this is an unacceptable 
state of affairs." 144 
The Heinz Center report sought to address the lack of reliable 
and comprehensive environmental data by developing and 
publishing a series of indicators of ecosystem health. While still 
underway, this project was hampered by the lack of adequate data, 
as some or all of the necessary data was missing for nearly 70 
percent of the chosen indicators. 145 The report noted there was 
sufficient data to report nationally on only 58 of the 1 03 chosen 
indicators; 146 complete data only existed for only thirty-three 
indicators. 147 Thirty-one indicators had "inadequate data," and 
fourteen indicators were not repmied at all. 148 In some cases the 
data was unreliable, inconsistent, or incomplete. In others cases 
the report suggested the gaps could be filled with relatively little 
effort. The report concluded that "until and unless these gaps are 
filled, Americans will not have access to a complete picture of the 
'state of the nation's ecosystems."' 149 In other words, after over 
thirty years of substantial federal environmental regulation, there is 
no adequate measurement of overall ecosystem health. 
142 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST 
ANNuAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 237 (1970). 
143 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. AND THE ENV'T, THE STATE OF 
THE NATION'S ECOSYSTEMS: MEASURJNG THE LANDS, WATERS, AND 
LIVING RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/pdf_files/sotne_complete.pdf. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 203. 
146 Jd. at 18. 
147 Jd. 
148 The remaining twenty-five indicators had "some" data. Id. 
149 Jd. 
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Other studies confirm the general fmdings of the Heinz Center 
report. For instance, a recent study conducted for Resources for 
the Future on the use of science at the EPA, concluded that "the 
state of environmental science is characterized by a chronic lack of 
data and a primitive understanding of many biological, physical, 
and ecological processes."150 Additionally, "monitoring data" on 
pollutants are "generally unavailable for most substances," and the 
"[a]vailable data tend to be sparse, of poor quality, or both."151 
This problem is likely to persist as the percentage of EPA's budget 
devoted to research has declined substantially since the agency's 
founding in 1970.152 Yet the problem is not merely a lack of data, 
as EPA scientists "also lack a fundamental mechanistic 
understanding of how pollutants cause harm."153 Some of these 
deficiencies are due to the institutional and political incentives 
facing EPA officials.154 
For years the Government Accountability Office (formerly 
known as the General Accounting Office, "GAO") has 
documented widespread gaps in environmental data and scientific 
research. In 1995, GAO told Congress about "numerous long-
standing problems with EPA's efforts to collect and manage the 
scientific data that form the basis of regulatory decisions."155 
150 MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY 
PROCESS 125 (1999) (but also noting that "the current state of science is 
generally sufficient to provide a basis for sound regulatory decisions in routine 
cases in which the stakes ... are relatively low"); see also U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OPTIONS EXIST TO ll\1PROVE EPA'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND 
MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf (noting lack of data on risks posed by 
chemical substances subject to EPA regulation). 
151 POWELL, supra note 150, at 126. 
152 See id. at 2-3 (noting that one-third of EPA's budget once funded the 
Office of Research and Development, but that "ORD's budget now hovers in the 
single digits"). 
153 !d. at 126. 
154 For instance, Powell observes that "environmental data collection falls in 
and out of favor over time, resulting in a discontinuous series of broad, shallow 
efforts." !d. at 112. Moreover, EPA is fundamentally a "regulatory agency" 
rather than a "science agency," and it is "dominated by a legalistic culture that 
often looks for engineering-based solutions to meet statutory obligations." Id. at 
2. See also Elliott, supra note 141; MARc K. LANDY ET AL., THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS (1994). 
155 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-95-174, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: EPA'S PROBLEMS WITH COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF 
SCIENTIFIC DATA AND ITS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THEM 1 (1995), available at 
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Specifically, GAO noted that "[m]any of EPA's scientific data sets 
are either incomplete, obsolete, or missing altogether, a problem 
that extends across all media areas."156 In addition, GAO reported 
that the EPA's "problems in obtaining quality data are exacerbated 
by difficulties in managing the data that are available."157 GAO 
noted that these problems were "longstanding" and were not 
confined to one or two isolated program areas. 158 
While there have been efforts to address chronic gaps in data 
and scientific research over the past decade, substantial problems 
remain. In 1999, GAO reported that the EPA lacks fundamental 
scientific environmental data concerning various pollutants and 
their effects on human and ecosystem health. 159 In 2000, GAO 
concluded that the EPA's national water quality inventory "does 
not accurately portray water quality conditions nationwide," in 
large part because data are only collected for a small percentage of 
the nation's waters. 160 Not only does the EPA not collect 
sufficient data, but it does not ensure consistency and compatibility 
across state-collected data. 161 GAO concluded that "the dearth of 
the waters actually monitored, combined with the wide variation 
among states' monitoring and assessment approaches, make the 
national statistics umeliable and subject to misinterpretation and, 
therefore, of limited usefi.llness .... "162 
These are not isolated findings. A 2003 GAO study reported 
that "[ n ]o federal entity has comprehensively assessed the 
availability and use of freshwater to meet the nation's needs in 25 
years. "163 It fi.1rther reported that state water managers believed 
http:/ /archive.gao.gov/t2pbat 1/154 23 8 .pdf. 
156 !d. 
157 !d. 
158 !d. at 3. 
159 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-261, ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION: EPA Is TAKJNG STEPS TO IMPROVE INFORlvlATION 
MANAGEMENT, BUT CHALLENGES REMAJN 4-5 (1999), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99261.pdf ("These extensive data gaps are a 
result both of a lack of fundamental scientific lmowledge and of inadequate data 
collection, according to EPA and others."). 
160 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-54, WATER QUALITY: 
KEY EPA AND STATE DECISIONS LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE 
DATA 5 (2000), available at http://www .gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00054.pdf. 
161 !d. at 6. 
162 !d. 
163 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-514, FRESHWATER SUPPLY: 
STATES' VIEWS ·oF HOW FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD HELP THEM MEET THE 
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-that more water data and greater flexibility in complying with 
federal environmental laws would help states to meet their water 
resource needs. 164 The National Research Council, a division of 
the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") likewise reported that 
"observational networks to measure various water characteristics 
have been in decline during the last 30 years because of political 
and fiscal instabilities."165 This is particularly true for systems 
monitoring "streamflow, groundwater, sediment transport, water 
quality and water use."166 Although the "number, complexity, and 
severity of water problems are growing," the NAS found that 
investment in the scientific studies necessary to address such 
problems has "stagnated."167 The NAS panel found that too much 
of current research is focused on short-term concerns and "[t]oo 
little of it is focused on the kind of fundamental, integrated, 
longer-term research that will be required if current and emerging 
water problems are to be addressed successfully."168 
A 2001 report by the National Academy of Public 
Administration ("NAP A") also found major deficiencies in the 
EPA's information systems for overseeing and monitoring state 
and federal environmental program performance.169 The NAP A 
report further found that 
[D]ata from EPA and state systems are hard to use in 
assessing changes of environmental conditions at specific 
locations and in evaluating the environmental and compliance 
performance of individual facilities, groups of facilities, or 
responsible government agencies. As a result, Congress, EPA, 
state legislatures, and the public cannot readily evaluate the 
effectiveness, efficiency, or equity of federal and state 
CHALLENGES OF EXPECTED SHORTAGES 44 (2003), available at 
http://www .gao.gov/new.items/ d03514.pdf. 
164 Jd. at 76. Of course, state water managers also stated that they would 
benefit from greater financial assistance. Id. at 77. 
165 COMM. ON ASSESSMENT OF WATER REs. RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, CONFRONTING THE NATION'S WATER PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF 
RESEARCH 180 (2004). 
166 Jd. at 195. 
167 Jd. at 16. 
168 Jd. 
169 See NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROGRESS: HOW EPA AND THE STATES CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE INFORMATION 1-5 (2001), available at 
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/environmenta1.pdf. 
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enforcement and compliance assistance programs. 170 
Similarly, a 2004 GAO report noted significant "gaps" and 
"duplication of effort" in water quality data. 171 
The lack of data can inhibit sound policy formation at all 
levels of government. In recent litigation over revisions to the 
EPA's "New Source Review" regulations, the agency was forced 
to acknowledge that its environmental impact analysis could not 
"reasonably quantify" the impact of the proposed regulatory 
changes on public health because the analysis was "based upon 
incomplete data."172 GAO likewise concluded that the 
environmental impact of the mle was "uncertain because oflimited 
data and difficulty in detennining how industrial companies will 
respond to the mle."173 
A lack of quality environmental data also makes it difficult to 
identify environmental baselines for the purpose of measuring 
environmental progress or decline. In 2004 EPA announced the 
classification under fish advisories of a record proportion of the 
nation's rivers and streams due to contamination from mercury and 
other toxic substances. 174 While there were only 20 fish advisories 
in 1993, there were 175 by 2001, and 386 by 2003. 175 Yet the 
increased number of advisories was not due to any measured 
increase in water pollution or fish contamination; indeed, 
emissions of mercury and other contaminants of concern have 
declined substantially over the same time period that the number of 
fish advisories skyrocketed. 176 Rather, the increased number of 
170 !d. at 3. 
171 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
MANAGEMENT: BETTER COORDINATION OF 
NEEDED TO SUPPORT KEY DECISIONS 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04382.pdf. 
GA0-04-382, WATERSHED 
DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS 
6 (2004), available at 
172 New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2005). It is possible that it 
would be exceedingly difficult to quantifY these effects even if there were more 
comprehensive data collection because much is dependent upon predictions 
about industry behavior under a different set of regulatory requirements. 
173 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-947, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA 
SHOULD USE AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO 
THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 24 (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03947.pdf. 
174 See U.S. EPA, EPA-823-F-04-016, FACT SHEET: NATIONAL LISTING OF 
FISH ADVISORIES (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/ 
advisories/factsheet.pdf. 
175 Jd. at 3 tb1.3. 
176 Jd. at I (noting that U.S. mercury emissions have declined by 50 percent 
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fish advisories was du~ to in part to an increase in water quality 
testing conducted by environmental agencies. 177 In other words, 
more rivers and streams were under fish advisories than ever 
before because more river miles were tested than ever before. 
While the federal government invests substantial resources in 
environmental protection, and enforces a wide array of 
environmental regulations, these efforts are not focused on those 
areas in which the case for federal involvement is the strongest. 
Just as the federal government has failed to address interstate 
pollution spillovers, it has failed to concentrate federal resources in 
those areas where federal efforts are most warranted due to 
economies of scale. This mismatch undermines the effectiveness 
of federal environmental protection. 
IV. STATE-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES 
The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy distorts 
state environmental policymaking and can have significant 
environmental consequences. As a result of extensive federal 
involvement in areas best left in state or local hands, state policy 
development is heavily distorted. 178 The lack of a match 
between the scope of environmental problems and the political 
jurisdictions asserting authority over such concerns leads to poor 
prioritization. The over-centralization of environmental policy 
further compounds the problem of excessive rigidity created by 
excessive uniformity. 179 The extension of federal authority into 
areas more properly left under state and local control does 
not extinguish the demand for greater environmental protection at 
the state and local level. It does, however, rechannel it. One 
consequence of the mismatch is that state and local policy makers 
increasingly tum to environmental issues and concerns where the 
case for federal dominance is stronger. 
The most obvious way federal action influences state 
environmental protection efforts is when federal rules preempt 
conflicting or varying state rules. For example, section 209(b) of 
since 1990). 
177 !d. at 2. Another contributing factor was the increased use of statewide 
advisories in response to state testing results. !d. 
178 The full range of federal regulation's potential effects on state regulatory 
activity is surveyed in Adler, supra note 81. 
179 See, e.g., BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that excessive 
centralization produces "inflexibility and inertia"). 
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the Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting "any standard 
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles."180 
Similarly, the Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state 
regulation of automotive fuel economy .181 Preemption can be 
express, as in the above examples, or implied. 182 Where implied 
preemption is found, federal regulation will typically preclude any 
state or local regulation whatsoever. 183 
Because preemption operates to prevent state regulatory 
activity, the net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less 
regulation than there would have been otherwise. 184 Where federal 
measures are insufficiently protective, or where federally imposed 
uniformity is inefficient, there will be suboptimal results. As a 
recent environmental group report concluded, " [ f] ederal 
preemption of states' ability to go above and beyond the federal 
floor suppresses states' creativity in developing new approaches to 
solving public policy problems, such as air pollution."185 
Sometimes federal preemption may be justified by economies of 
scale. In other cases, however, preemption precludes the adoption 
of state-level standards that are more tailored to local or regional 
conditions and needs. 
As a practical matter, a federal regulatory "floor" can become 
a ceiling. The existence of a federal standard may discourage state 
180 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). There are exceptions to this rule. The EPA 
may waive preemption of emission standards adopted by California, subject to 
certain conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000). Where the EPA has approved a 
waiver for California, other states may adopt the California rule. In all cases, 
however, the other 49 states may not adopt a "third" standard. The Clean Air 
Act contains similar provisions governing standards for gasoline. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2ll(c)(4). 
181 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2000). Unlike emission standards, there is no 
conditional exemption for California. 
182 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'! Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(state regulation is preempted "where the scheme of federal regulation is so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it") (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947)). 
183 See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental 
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 237, 258-59 (2000). 
184 In some cases the purpose of federal preemption is to replace one type of 
regulation with another, though this results in less regulation than if the federal 
regulation was adopted in addition to the state regulation. 
185 U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, POWER TO PROTECT: THE CRITICAL ROLE STATES 
PLAY IN CLEANING UP POLLUTION FROM MOBILE SOURCES 34 (2005), available 
at http://uspirg.org/reports/powertoprotect.pdf. 
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policyrnakers from adopting and maintaining more stringent 
measures of their own, even where such measures could be 
justified. Many states have adopted legislation to prevent state 
environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that 
are more protective than federal rules. 186 New Mexico and 
Colorado, for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation 
of air pollution controls more stringent than what would be 
required by federal law. 187 Virginia law bars state regulatory 
authorities from requiring greater amounts of water treatment than 
mandated under the federal Clean Water Act. 188 Others states have 
general prohibitions against agency promulgation of environmental 
rules more stringent than federal law. 189 Insofar as federal 
standards are not based upon accurate, up-to-date scientific 
assessments of environmental problems, and such information 
about the nature and extent of environmental problems is not 
available to state and local policymakers, the federal regulation 
may have an even greater distorting effect on state priorities. 
The mere existence of a federally mandated,_ floor also 
preempts contrary state policies and environmental priorities. If a 
local community has different health and environment-related 
regulatory priorities, it still must meet the requirements of federal 
law.190 In 2000, for example, the outgoing Clinton Administration 
proposed lowering the federal standard for arsenic in drinking 
186 See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt 
Environmental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy 
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REv. 1373, 1376-86 
(1995); see also Arnold W. Rietze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and 
Maintenance Program under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1465 (1996) 
(noting "movement among state legislature to prohibit more stringent 
state standards"). This phenomenon continues today. See James M. 
Taylor, Indiana Bill Would Ban State Agencies from Tightening 
EPA Standards, ENV'T & CLIMATE NEWS, June 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.heartland.org/ Article.cfm?artid=17173. 
187 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5 (LexisNexis 2000); CoLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-7-114.2 (2004). 
188 SeeVACODEANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (2001). 
189 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12A.l20(1·)(A) (LexjsNexis 2003) 
(prohibiting all administrative regulations "more stringent than the federal law or 
regulations"). 
190 See, e.g., Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion over Environmental Rules 
Grew from a Patch of Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A16 (quoting a 
Columbus, Ohio health official as complaining that "the new rules coming out of 
Washington are taking money from decent programs and making me waste tlfem 
on less important problems"). · 
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water from 50 to 10 parts per billion (ppb ), largely to reduce the 
risk of bladder cancer from arsenic consumption. 191 While the 
leaders of national environmental groups cheered the proposed 
reduction in the federal arsenic standard, many communities faced 
with high compliance costs were less enthusiastic.192 In Los 
Lunas, New Mexico groundwater naturally contains 12-19 ppb of 
arsenic. Local officials estimated that reducing arsenic levels to 
the new 10 ppb standard would cost $14 million. 193 Local experts 
also noted that while New Mexico has among the highest natural 
concentrations of arsenic in groundwater in the country, it also has 
among the lowest rates of bladder cancer, leading many to 
question whether spending millions to reduce local arsenic levels 
was the most cost-effective way to safeguard public health. 194 
There is even evidence that the federal arsenic rule will increase 
risks to public health in some communities insofar as the higher 
water rates necessary to pay for the change induces some families 
to opt for water from their own wells. 195 Yet insofar as residents 
of Los Lunas, or any other community, wish to adopt different 
drinking water standards that are more in line with their 
environmental and public health needs, and lack the resources to 
pursue every laudable public health or environmental goal, the 
federal standard precludes them from acting on their preferences. 
While the federal government may preempt state regulatory 
action, and may require state compliance with a general regulatory 
scheme that does not target states-as-states, it cannot force states to 
adopt federally desired regulations. It can, however, offer various 
inducements to encourage state "cooperation." The federal 
government may, for instance, condition funding on state 
cooperation or threaten to preempt state and local regulations if 
such measures do not meet federal requirements. This approach is 
191 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and 
Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 6976, 6980-81 (Jan. 22, 2001). 
192 One state, Nebraska, even sued the U.S. EPA to overturn the standard after 
it was finally adopted by the Bush Administration. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 
F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
193 SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 171. 
194 !d.; see also id. at 178 ("[A]ccording to Betty Behrend, Los Lunas's 
utilities and public works director, 'The community need[ ed] other things worse 
[than lowered arsenic levels]'."). 
195 !d. at 178; see also Floyd Frost, Poisonous Decision: A Low Arsenic 
Standard Carries a High Cost, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,2001, at B5. 
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~typically referred to as "cooperative federalism," 196 though many 
analysts question whether the relationship can be properly 
described as "cooperative."197 Particularly where the consequence 
of state refusal to cooperate is the imposition of a federal 
regulatory scheme, the "cooperative federalism" model does not 
leave much flexibility in the scope and design of regulatory 
programs. 
Even where federal involvement is supposed to be 
"cooperative," states are often precluded or at least discouraged 
from adopting environmental policies that would be more efficient 
or effective at addressing their particular environmental concerns 
and demands. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the federal 
government uses the . threat of sanctions to impose federal air 
pollution control priorities on state governments. Bpecifically, the 
threatened loss of highway flli1ds induces states to adopt that mix 
of air pollution control measures preferred by federal 
policymakers, even when an alternative mix of pollution control 
measures may produce greater environmental results. The 
adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other 
forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental 
196 
''[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the 
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the 
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state 
law pre-empted by federal regulation. This arrangement ... has been 
termed ... cooperative federalism." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
167 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). 
197 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 22, at 1185 ("So much political power has 
been reallocated to the federal government that, at times, the states could be 
mistaken for vassals of the federal government."); Robert V. Percival, 
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. 
L. REv. 1144 (1995) ("[F]ederal environmental standards have been a chronic 
source of friction for federal-state relations."). States are frequent litigants 
challenging the validity or implementation of federal environmental regulations. 
See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenging 
federal regulations requiring nitrogen oxide emission reductions under state 
implementation plans); Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(challenging federal regulations requiring nitrogen oxide emission reductions 
under state implementation plans); Virginia v. EPA, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (challenging federal vehicle emission standards). For more on cooperative 
federalism in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green 
Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for 
Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 573, 575-82, 616-25 (1998). See 
also DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND 
THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION {1997); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative 
Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 183-88 
(2005). 
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problems. 198 Although ostensibly designed to reduce automotive 
emissions, there is substantial scientific evidence that oxygenated 
fuels provide little environmental benefit, 199 and can even cause 
environmental harm.200 This is not the only instance in which the 
Clean Air Act mandates may impede the achievement of optimal 
levels of environmental protection. Because the formation of 
tropospheric ozone ("smog") is in part dependent upon ratios of 
ozone precursors in the ambient air, measures that reduce ozone 
levels in some cities increase ozone levels elsewhere?01 Some 
_ 
198 As Justice Breyer, then Judge Breyer, observed, "one can find many 
examples of regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental effects 
on another" STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 22 (1993). On this point, see Frank R Cross, The 
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionmy Prindple, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 
851 (1996) (chronicling potential negative public health and environmental 
impacts from environmental regulation); Edward W. Warren & Gary E. 
Merchant, "More Good Than Harm": A First Principle for Environmental 
Agendes and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 379, 390 (1993) (same). 
199 See, e.g., COMM. ON OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFORMULATED 
GASOLINE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OZONE FORMING POTENTIAL OF 
REFORMULATED GASOLINE 7 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog/9461.htrnl ("[T]he use of commonly available oxygenates in RFG has 
little impact on improving ozone air quality and has some disadvantages."); id. at 
45 (noting there is "uncertainty" as to whether any of the documented 
improvement in urban air quality is due to the use ofreformulated gasoline). At 
times, EPA has sought to use the federal oxygenate requirement to benefit 
ethanol producers and other agricultural interests improve at the expense of air 
quality. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
200 See Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that waiver of 
federal oxygenate requirement would reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides); 
Harold M. Haskew et al., Fuel Permeation from Automotive Systems 1 
(Coordinating Research Council Project No. E-65, 2004), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/gasoline/permeation/090204finalrpt.pdf 
(documenting increased auto-related emissions from the use of ethanol as an 
oxygenate); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-02-753T, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: MTBE CONTAMINATION FROM UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS 2 
(2002) (reporting that a majority of states have found MTBE in groundwater). 
See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, supra note 77, at 19 (characterizing 
the "clean fuels" program as an ethanol subsidy with little regard for 
environmental benefits). 
201 See, e.g., COMM. ON TROPOSPHERJC OZONE FORMATION AND 
MEASUREMENT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING TI-lE OZONE PROBLEM 
IN URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION 12 (1992), available at 
http:/!books.nap.edu/books/03090463 I 9/htmi/index.html ("[N]Ox [nitrogen 
oxide] reductions can have either a beneficial or detrimental effect on ozone 
concentrations, depending on the locations and emissions rates of VOC [volatile 
organic compound] and NOx sources in a region."). 
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earlier measures had similar effects. For instance, air pollution 
control provisions adopted as part of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal 
producers at the expense of their competitors, and air quality 
suffered as a result. 202 
Federal inaction can alter state environmental policy priorities 
just as much as federal action. In some cases, federal failure to 
conduct scientific research leaves states without the scientific and 
technical information necessary to set environmental priorities in 
accordance with local preferences. The failure of federal 
policymakers to address new or emerging environmental concerns 
has encouraged states to become more aggressive in their approach 
to such problems.203 New York State, for example, sought to 
restrict the sale of sulfur-dioxide emission credits under the Clean 
Air Act due to concerns that such sales could increase pollution 
within the state. 204 Yet because the federal government is 
disproportionately active in those areas where there is no strong 
case for federal involvement, states may be disproportionately 
active in those areas where federal action, and perhaps even 
federal preemption, would be preferable. 
Global climate change policy is a prime example of increasing 
state activity where federal action would provide for a greater 
jurisdictional match. In recent years, state governments have 
become quite active on climate change, both for and against 
greater action to control greenhouse gas emissions.205 As of 2004, 
202 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, 
DIRTY AIR (1981) (describing the role ofregional coal producers in the adoption 
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). 
203 See TESKE, supra note 21, at 168 ("A number of states ... have tried to 
move aggressively to deal with pollution problems, viewing federal 
policymaking as increasingly in a condition of policy gridlock."); see also 
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 108, 111-12 (2005). 
204 See Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161-62 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (striking down New York law on dormant commerce clause 
grounds). For more background on this litigation, see generally Andrew D. 
Thompson, Public Health, Environmental Protection, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Soyereignty in the Federalist Structure, 55 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 213 (2004). 
205 See TESKE, supra note 21, at .17 (noting several states adopted 
carbon dioxide standards, while others oppose ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol); see also BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE 
EVOLVING ·· STATE ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2002), available 
at http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm?documentiD=295 (current state 
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28 states had begun developing greenhouse gas emission 
policies.206 Some, such as New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire, adopted emission reduction targets. In July 2002, 
California adopted legislation requi1ing the California Air 
Resources Board to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve 
the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions from motor vehicles."207 The state has also 
embarked on an ambitious plan to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25 percent over the next fifteen years.208 Others 
states have adopted voluntary plans. New York and seven other 
states, mostly in the Northeast, also filed suit directly against 
various Midwestern utilities alleging that their failure to control 
greenhouse gas emissions constitutes common law nuisance.209 
This activity is the result, in pari, of relative federal inaction on 
climate change.210 Setting aside the question of whether regulatory 
action to control greenhouse gases is worthwhile, it should be clear 
that any such action is best undertaken at the national (if not 
international) level, rather than by state and local governments. 
policies indicate that a "bottom-up approach to addressing global climate 
change" is inevitable for "a nation as physically large and economically diverse 
as the United States"); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 281,282 (2003) (noting that 
many states "have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that some believe 
exists at the national level"). 
206 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVlTIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004 UPDATE 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm?documentlD=295. 
207 A.B. 1493, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 43018.5(a) (West 
2005). 
208 Juliet Eilprin, Cal!fornia Plan Aims to Slash Emissions, WASH. POST, Jun. 
2, 2005, at A4. 
209 See Miguel Bustillo, States to Sue Over Global Warming, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 
21, 2004, at B8; see also Andrew C. Revkin, New York City and 8 States Plan to 
Sue Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2004, at Al5. In September 2005, a 
federal district court dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that it presented a 
nonjusticiable political question. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 
2005 WL 2347900 (S.D.N.Y., Sep. 22, 2005). 
210 See, e.g., Harry Stoffer, Fuel Economy Battle: Lack of Action on National 
Level Forcing Groups to Push Regulations on State Level, TIRE BUSINESS, May 
23, 2005, at 6 (noting Sierra Club efforts to push climate policies at the state 
level); Buzbee, supra note 203, at 112. 
2005] MISMATCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 177 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental protections would be more successful if 
responsibility were divided between the federal and state 
governments in a more justifiable manner.211 Ideally, the federal 
government should reorient its efforts toward those areas in which 
the federal government possesses an institutional advantage, due to 
economies of scale, or where state and local governments are 
incapable of addressing environmental problems, such as where 
there are substantial interstate spillovers. A greater "match" 
between the scope of environmental problems and the institutions 
entrusted with addressing such concerns would enhance the 
efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of existing environmental 
protection efforts. 
The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy was not 
created overnight, nor can it be cured easily.212 Numerous reports 
and studies have identified the deficiency in federal research and 
scientific knowledge relevant to environmental concerns, and there 
is some evidence of progress on this front. Addressing the 
jurisdictional mismatch will be more difficult; at present there is 
little interest in revisiting the basic structure of federal 
environmental law in the legislative or executive branch. Nor are 
courts likely to force wholesale revisions in existing federal 
environmental regulations.213 
One possible means of addressing the jurisdictional mismatch 
would be to create greater opportunities for states to free 
themselves of inappropriate federal requirements. Elsewhere this 
author has proposed a policy of "ecological forbearance," under 
which states could petition federal agencies for waivers from 
federal requirements where no compelling reasons exist to enforce 
the federal rule.214 Such a policy would enable states to 
experiment with alternative means of environmental protection, 
211 See Buzbee, supra note 3, at 57 (noting that any reform that does not · 
divide regulatory tasks among different levels of government "would be highly 
unlikely to create effective regulation"). 
212 See, e.g., id. at 50-51 (noting that the likelihood of "fundamental 
reorganization" of governmental responsibility "appears too far-fetched to justify 
much attention," but that "reallocation of responsibilities in particular subject 
areas" may be "a viable answer"). 
213 See Adler, supra note 8, at 453, 471-72. 
214 See Adler, supra note 1, at 272-81. A similar proposal was suggested by 
Professor Farber. See FARBER, supra note I, at 194-98. 
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which could reopen the laboratories of democracy in 
enviromnental policy. It also would have the potential to free up 
federal resources to focus on those areas m which interstate 
spillovers or economies of scale reqmre greater federal 
involvement. 
However it is accomplished, fixing the current jurisdictional 
mismatch should be a high priority for environmental reform. 
Despite the environmental successes of the past three decades, the 
overlapping and contradictory state and federal rules do not lead to 
efficient or effective environmental protection. It is in some 
senses an historical accident that state leadership in environmental 
policy was supplanted by federal regulation, and environmental 
policy could be improved if states regained more of their historic 
role. The federal government did not come to dominate 
environmental policy because a more decentralized system was 
leading to environmental ruin.215 Yet environmental protection 
could be improved if federal dominance was confined to those 
areas in which the federal government has something unique to 
contribute. 
215 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 93 (2004) (arguing that the "conventional 
fable" that the decentralized system of dealing with environmental problems lead 
to disasters necessitating federal regulation is not an adequate explanation of the 
rise of the federal role in environmental protection). 
